I. INTRODUCTION There is a growing concern among ecoiiomists about the appropriateness of traditional macroeconomic models for the analysis of open urban unemployment, particularly in less developed countries (LDC's). 1 The apparently irrational continuation of rural-urban migration in the face of open urban employment has stimulated the development of new kinds of models that analyze migration and urban unemployment simultaneously. Known as job-search models, these have shifted the emphasis from labor demand to labor supply considerations in the explanation of urban unemployment. 2 They generally include a rural and an urban sector, the latter characterized by an institutionally fixed wage above the market-clearing level, and consider migration and job search unemployment as rational maximizing behavior. People migrate in response to the expected ruralurban wage differential, with the urban unemployment rate acting as a regulating force.
The best known of these job-search models, that of Harris and Todaro (1970) , predicted rates of unemployment that substantially exceeded the urban unemployment rates actually observed in most LDC's. 3 These significant gaps between predicted and observed rates of unemployment stimulated the development of more complicated search models with improved predictive performance. Most notably, these more recent models depart from the initial simplistic view that in urban areas open unemployment is the only alternative to wage employment in the modern sector; they do this by incorporating two * We wish to thank Bela Balassa and Robert Dorfman for comments on an earlier version. The views presented here are the authors' and do not represent those of their respective instittitions. 
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urban sectors: A modern-protected-formal or organized sector where wages are instil utionallv fixed above the market-clearing level characterized by restrictions to entry, and a traditional-unprotectedinformal-unorganized or murky sector with free entry anu ;--.ere wages perform a market-clearingv role. 4 In introducing an iniformal-unprotectedi sector, these mnodels' basic premise is that the same forces explaining the equilibriumi allocation of workers between the rural and urban sector can also explain their choices between employiment in the unprotected sector and open unemployment while searching for a better job in the protected sector. 5 The notion that Unemploy ment in the presence of an unprotected free-entry sector is a resullt of a rational process of job search provides a point of departure for analyzing several qUest ions concerning the urban economy.
The purpose of this paper is to use this framework to addre, s two questions: (a) What is the social marginal product oef types of labor that differ in the sense that they represent different inputs in the production function; (b) what is the relationship between the social marginal product of labor and the ob)served market wage in the unprotected sector? In other words, what adjtistnietibs mujst be made to the observed wage in the uiniprotecte(d sector--which does resp)ondl to market forces--in order to (lerive the true marginal montribution of labor?
The possibility of estimating the opportunity cost of lal)or from observable market data is operationally useful in project evaluation. Furthermore, by defining labor categories according to levels of schooling-in this case "educated" and "Uneducated" lab)or---wve can evaluate the marginal contributionl of e(lucat ion and it.s relation to the observed wage structure in the unprotecte(l sector. This becomes crucial in assessing the contribution of educational investnments from observed market data.
Assume that we are evaluating an educational project that "4produces" laborers of a given level of education in an urban economy where (i) there is unemployment of that type of labor, and (ii) t.here exists a spectrum of wages for aiiy given level of educat ion. Which of these wages, or combination of them, shoul( l)e used to omun)Lte the social marginal contribution of a worker with a given level of education? Before 1)resenting an explicit treatment of this (lue';t ionl we review some intuitive suggestions that have been advanced( to measure, under this scenario, the so cial marginal J)ro(l uct. of labor with a given education.( (a) The marginal conitribution is zero as long as unemnployinent of that type of labor exists. The implicit underlying hypothesis is that unemployment is of an involuntary nature, i.e., at the prevailing wages, that kind of labor is in excess supply in every market. Under these circurn. ,ices, an extra worker either becomes uniemployed, or by finding a vacancy, prevents the employment of another laborer.
Since we are concerned with voluntary unemployment in the context of free entry competitive markets that coexist with restricted ones, this suggestion is not relevant to our purpose.
(b) The marginal contribution should be measured as a weighted average of the wage earnings of that type of labor in each market, including zero for the unemployed, the weights being the fraction of the total labor force in each market. Implicitly this view assumes that extra workers entering the labor force will be allocated among different markets the same proportion as the existing labor force. As will be demonstrated later, the acceptance of a theoretical framework of job-search unemnployment does not sustain this hypothesis.
(c) The ma-rginal contribution should be measured by the wage in the free entry market as long as such a market exists. Proponienits of this view argue that if the worker is lucky and fills a highly paid vacancy in a restricted market, his net contribution is still the free entry wage, since he has simply replaced a colleague working in the free entry sector. If instead he enters this latter sector, then the free entry wage again reflects his contribution. Finally, if he becomes unemployed, he induces a presently unemployed worker to accept a free entry sector job. Therefore, his net contribution is still reflected by the free entry sector wage.
The notion that a free entry labor market coexists with a restricted labor market appears to reflect correctly the situation of the urban economies in most LDC's and has become an acceptable working hypothesis in dealing with them. However, if there is a free entry labor market, unemployment must be voluntary. In these circumstances, it seems far from obvious that an extra worker in the labor supply induces one additional worker to become employed in the free entry sector, which would imply that the free entry sector wage correctly reflects the social marginal contributioni of labor. This p)roposition assumes a particular imemployment behavior that results in a constant volume of uniemployment in spite of an extra worker in the labor force.
The purpose of this paper is to model explicitly employmenituniemployment behavior when there is a free entry market and to derive the true inarginal conltribution to the econiomy of additional labor classified by education. Section IT an-alyzes the nature of labor market segmentation and the existen ce of voluntary unemploymellet. Section III spells out an emplovment-unlempl)lo.yrment strategy characterizing the behavior of workers outside the l)rotected sector, and Section IV integrates that behavior into a production function framework for the assessment of the true marginal cont ribit tioni of different types of labor. Finally, Section V atteml)ts an emn)irical evaluation of these social contributions and suLIMnarizrs the main conclusions.
II. SEGMENTED URBAN LABOR MARKErTS ANI) T*E EXIsTIFE.N'E OF V0lL NI'.xII UNEN ¶Ir( vN11 N'I' For the purpose of simplicity we assume that for each type of labor classified by schooling ("educated" and "uneducated" wvorkers) there exist two urban labor markets with (lifferent wages prevailing in each. Wages clear the market. in the iinprotec tei free entry sector, 7 and the protected market is characterized by entry restrictions and a higher noncompetitive avage rate.
There is ample evidence to support this assumption. Of this wide variety of explanations for these sectoral wage differentials, the mllost common one is of an institutional natLre: labor unions, minimum vagre legislation, and political pressure on governments by organized labor keep protected .,ector wages above the market-clearing level. Other explanations relate to (a) the technological gap betwN-een the two sectors: firms utilizing technologies for which the on-the-job training , are high may offer wages above the equilibriumn level as . means of reducing labor turnover; and (b) the efficiency wage hypothesis:
higher wages lead to higher productivity, aiid therefore the wage rate that minimizes total labor costs in the protected sector may not correspond to the one pre-vailing in the unprotected sector. 8 The literatule on wage )olicies in LDC's contains several attempts to separate the impact. of governmnent intervention, union stretgtlh, and market forces on the wvage level of the p)rotected seclor.-) Regardless of the particular reasoni or comlbination of reasons for these wage (lifferentials in an urban economy, the protectedl sector can at least be icienit-itie(i. As Harl)erger points out:
Protected jobs e. i n ria I ilv be iidliilif l)i'(,iil'd sti flilV J)tiPOpolC %%anl them. ('ompanis pav-iiig wgio.g higher than marlke levels for ;viik ilkaht skills andl working conditioins ten(1 to lave very low labor Ioirtuwirn,merid bm"" lists of .ipphtam, wlitiniug fi)r .n tivning to arise (Harberger, 1971 , 1) !5GIA).
As noted above, the existence ol'free entry labor markets implies that observed uinemployinent must be voluntary. 'IThe und(Ierlying, hypothesis is that a worker inicreases his ..,;bability of obtaining a job in the protected sector by being unemr,ioyed and investing in search. The increase in this probability depends on the extent to which employment in the unprotected sector constrains the search for a protected job.' 0 The strength of this constraint depends on institlitional factors, particularly on the availability of job information, hirilln, practices, and the geographical distance between the two sectors.
The mere fact of the existence of a significant level of open unemployment constitutes indirect evidence that the perceived probability of finding a protected job is higher for the unemnployed. Kritz and Ramos (1976) provide more indirect evidence to support this contention. The three employment surveys utndertakeni by P.R.E.A.L.C. reported in their study showed very high rates of open urban unemployment: 20 percent in Managua, 15 percent in Santo Domingo, and 12 percent in Asunci6n. MWoreover, 35 percent of the unemployed in Managua, 51 percent of the unemployed in Santo Domingo, and 60 percent of the uinemployed in Asunci6n were not laid off but left their previous jobs voluntarily to search for beetter jobs. In synthesis, unemployment reflects a rational process of job senrcli, where the costs are the present forgone earnings in the free entry sector, and the benefits are the present value of a higher probability of finding a protected job.
III. THE EMPLOYMENT-UNEMPLOYMENT Di,x: ISION-MAKING
P110loc.EX Let us suppose that in each period all workers outside the protected sector compare two alternative employment plans:
(a) Plan One: To accept immediate employment in the free entry sector and remain there, unless one succeeds in the future in getting a protected sector job. The perceived probability of getti ng such a job in any particular future period-when the worker has spent the prior period working in the free entry sector-is equal to II.
(b) Plan Two: To devote the present period to inlcreasing the perceived probability of obtaining a protected sector job duriig the next period. We denote the increased probability by i311, where ,l represents the probability premium associated with search activities (j > 1). As seen from today, the worker plans to en ter the free entry sector next period if he is unable to obtaini emnployment in the protected sector.
In equilibrium the expected present value of the two employment plans must be equal. 1 
' Assuming that II is perceived as co(nstant over 474
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time, we may write this equality as (1) WT
where Wo is the present wage in ti-et free entry sector, WT and WT are the expected wages in the protected and free entry sectors for any future period T, and r is the relevant discounLt rate." 2 The left-hand side of this expression represents the expected present value of the second plan, while the right-hand side represents the value of the first plan. Rearranging terms, we may write the equilibrium condition as
as the present percentage wage differential between the two sectors and g as the expected growth rate of real wages, the employ)menit-unemply-))nmetnt equili brilmn condition can be written as follows:
where a = -1) 6 -1. It is important to notice again that, except for 5, all of the parameters entering expression (4) represenit expected magnitudes; they need not represent actual or effective parameters.
Two asstumptions have been made in arriving at expression (4). First, that the expected probabilities entering-the plan remain constant and equal to today's expected probal)ility or finding a p)rotected job next periodl. Second, workers considering the plans assutnie that the protected and unprotected wage will grow at the same rate. Both assuLmptions are not indepenident; rational behavior imnplies that the second assumption is require(d for the first one to holtl.
In cont.rast to the original Harris-Todaro specification, in which all protecte(d jobs turn over within each period, we are making the more realistic asstumption that when an individual gets a protected job he holds it. Therefore, the prohability of olbtaining a protected sector job is not the ratio of all jobs to the entire labor force, but. rather,
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the ratio of new jobs to the labor force outside the protected sector.
If the perceived probability of entering the protected sector is equal to the real one, 1 3 then for each type of labor, II can be def inied as
where V = the expected vacancies to be open next period in the protected sector arising from labor rotation, retirements, and net employment growth in the sector S = the number of equivalent searchers who are perceived as competitors by the worker in question L = today's employed workers in the unprotected sector U = the number of (volunltary) meminployed workers investing fully in search L the total number of workers outside the protected sector (L = L + U1) Lp = the employmenit in the protected sector X = the rate of openings in that employment (X VILI) A = the unemploynment rate (A = U/L) = the employment in the protected sector as a fraction of the labor force outside that sector (q = Lp 1 /L). An equilibrium level of voluntary unemnployiment for each type of labor requires that the expected present value of the two employment plans be equal. Expressions (4) and (5) are therefore specific for each labor category. Substituting (5) into (4), we get
Implicit in ( ) is the assumption that the free entry sector wage for educated workers is higher than the wage for uneducated workers in the protected sector; i.e., there is no incentive for educated wvorkers to coompet.e with noneducated workers Cor their protected jobs. Thlis assumption, although it can change the quantitative magniitudes of our conclusions, does not chang,e the basic nature of the issues addressed. 14 476
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IV. DERIVING THE CONTRIBUTION OF LABOR TO OUTPUT
Assume that the aggregate production function in the free entry sector can be written as
where now L 1 and L 2 represent two types of labor, uneducated and educated workers, and K represents an index of nonlabor inputs. The level of employment in this sector is determined by the condition that the marginal product of each type of labor equals its wage rate:
. We now evaluate the total contribution to output of an additional worker of each educational level who enters the labor force. This contril)ution will differ from the observed present wages in the unprotected sector (WI, W 2 ) and will depend on the additional employment induced by the extra worker himself. This induced employment effect is the resuilt of two sets of forces: First, the extra worker changes the probability that each of his colleagues finds a protected job, affecting therefore their expected gains from being unemployed and thus encouraging them to take employment in the free entry sector. Second, to the extent that there are diminishing returns and factor complementarity or substitutability, the extra worker changes the equilibrium wage of both types of labor. This change in the equilibrium wage has a further employment effect through its impact on the r elative profital)ility of unemployment. The above effects can be summarized as
, where dLi/dLi and dlJ,/dL, represent the "own employment effect" and "cross employment effects" induced by an extra worker respectively. Given that the unprotected wages for both types of labor are observable market data, the evaluation of their contribLu6tions to output re(uiiires knowledge of the employmenit terms. Since wages in the protected sector are exogenously determnined, additional wvorkers in the labor force will affect neither employment nor output in th,at sector. The entire contribution of additional labor can be miieastured by the changes in the free entry sector output.. The enmployment t.erms (lefine(i above can be obtained by differentiating expression (6):
where'
and
77ii represents the own price elasticity of demand for labor i in the unprotected sector (m77i < 0). mej is the inverse of the (cross' elasticity of the marginal product of labor i with respect to the employment of labor j. For most situations 77ij > 0, the, marginal product of labor i increases when the employment of labor j increases. Expression (10) is positive if A > 0, this condition being fulfilled by any Concave production function.' 6 Expression (11) will be positive as long as 77ij is positive.
The own employment effect described in equation (10) consists of three multiplicative effects summarized by its three multiplicative terms: a "probability effect," an "own wage effect," and a "cross wage effect." The probability effect is positive due to the fact that an additional worker in the labor supply increases the number of searchers and therefore lowers the probability of getting a protected job. This induces additional libor to accept enmployment in the unprotected sector.1 7 The "own wage effect" is smaller than one if m7ii is less than infinite. In that case additional employment in the unprotected sector drives down the wage rate and increases the incentive to remain unemployed, partly offsetting the positive impact of the probability effect. The "cross wage effect" is positive and larger than one and reinforces the positive contributioll of the probability effect. This positive 'cross wage effect" occurs irrespective of both labors being substitutes or complements, i.e., irrespective of the sign of 7jjj.
The employment effects described above can also be shown graphically by deriving a supply schedule for each type of labor. Frorn the behavioral (equilibrium) condition (6) we can solve for L':
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where L must be interpreted as the number of laborers of type i willing to accept employment in the unprotected sector at a wage Wi. The demand for each labor becomes
The horizontal shift of the stuppfly curve in the face of an additional worker is equal to the pure prolb,ability effect. This effect is equal to (3i/li -1) .Xi, the change in emiployment, that would have taken place had the wage rate remnained constant. If the demand for labor i is not perfectly elastic, the wage rate Wi will tend to decline, having a negative effect on emp)loynment. This negative effect is the "own wage effect," represented by the second arrow. So long as the demand for labor is not completely inelastic, the net result of those two effects must be to increase employment.
Trhe cross wage effect is rep)resented by the third arrow. Notice that Figure I has been drawn so that the sum of both wvage effects is negative; i.e., the (negative) own wage effect is stroinger thani the (positive) cross wage effect. This doe.i not necessarily have to be so: if the cross wage effect. were stroniger than the own wage effect, the total wage effect Would have beeni p)ositive, reiniforcing the p)ositive probability effect. Therefore, we can contlucde that if the "cross wage effect" is eqtual to or larger than the "own wage effect" (resultillgr in a zero or positive "total wage effect"), an extra vworker in the labor force will induce an increase in emplkyment, for that type of labor, of more than one job.
We want now to explore the sign and magnitude of the marginal contributions to output of both types of labor as well as their relationships to the observed wage in the unprotected :;ector. By substituting (10) and (11) into (9), we can express these marginial contributions as follows:
The contribution of the own employment effect is always positive. The contribution of the cross employment effect is positive if both types of labor are technically complements and negativ'e if they are technically substituLtes. In the former case the total contribution is unambiguously positive. In the latter case a sufficient condition for a positive total contribution, which is fulfilled by any kind of C.E.S. production function, is (15)
F _<
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Wi Wj A priori we cannot speculate whether the true contribution to output of an additional worker will be larger or smaller than its observed wage in the unprotected sector. However, we can predict that the more elastic the demand for labor, the more complementary the technical relation between the two types of labor; tl.e lower the rate of job openings in the protected sector, the lower the rate of growth of wages; the larger the rate of discount, the smaller the relative size of the protected sector; and the smaller the premiuim to search, the more likely that the marginal contribution will exceed the observed wage in the unprotected sector.
V. EriPIRICAI, EVALUJATION
A. A Simplified Case
For the purpose of simplicity (and because of lack of in format ion)
we shall proceed with the assumption that F 1 2 = F 21 = 0 (or equivalently q12 = Xq21 = ), This assumption can be consistent with two (16) dX (1) [
The marginal contribution can be smaller or larger than the corresponding observed unprotected wage. The probability effect (oiloi -1), which is greater than one, is multiplied by a corrective factor (the own wage effect), which is smaller than one. 1 8 Before proceeding to the empirical evaluation of this last expression, we must assure the consistency of the parameters to be used. In order to assure that the equilibrium condition (6) holds, the unobservable parameter 3 i must be endogenously determined; i.e., the implicit search premium must be consistent with observable data if the world behaves as the model does. Solving for Oi from (6), we obain (17) i XiA (1 + gi) 
This value of f 3 z automatically insures the consistency of the model. An alternative possibility would be to assign values to ki arbitrarily so as to predict the equilibrium levels of unemployment. Since Ai is an unobservable parameter, this paper does not pursue this line of analysis.
B. The Urban Labor Market in ASUnLiCi(), Paraguay
The standard employment survey in LDC's does not usually collect the kind of information needed for an empirical evaluation of the theoretical framewvork presented above. Forttunately, an unorthodox study undertaken by PREAI C in Asunci6n, Paraguay, can provide us with most of the necessary information.1 9 By defining uneducated workers (LI) as those with six or less years of schooling and educated workers (L,2) as those with more than six years of schooling, we obtain the following parameters values: 2 ) The rate of growth of output in those activities most identified with the protected sector in Paraguay ranges from 5.4 to 6.4 percent per year for the 1962-1972 period. These figures do not represent the rate of growth of employment in these activities, which normally lags behind the growth rate of otitput. On the other hand, X, the rate of vacancy openings in the protected sector, includes not only the net growth of employment but also the retirement and rotation rates. Given these considerations, two alternative values for X will be used for the empirical evaluation: X = 0.05 and X = 0.07.
The average rate of growth of real wages in Latin America was approximately 3 percent between 1954 and 1972. Unfortunately, we lack specific information about the real rate of growth of urban wages in Paraguay. However, we do know that the rate of growth of urban real per capita income in Paraguay between 1962 and 1971 was 2.3 percent. This figure does not exactly represent the trend in real wages, since it is affected by an increasing rural-urban migration that results in an increasing volume of open unemployment. On the other hand, due to changing relative endowments of factors, wages for uneducated labor are expected to grow faster than those for educated labor. We shall use here 3 percent and 2.5 percent as the growth rate in wages for noneducated and educated labor, respectively. (gl = 0.030, g 2 = 0.025). The results will prove to be extremely insensitive to changes in these values.
Finally, we need values for r, the discount rate, and 77, the own price elasticity of demand for each type of labor. Following the practice in most of the empirical studies in LDC's, we shall use a 10 percent rate of discount. 21 In the absence of information about price elasticities, we presenit a series of estimates based on a wide range of reasonable demand elasticity values. Although the quantitative results vary with different elasticity values, the qualitative results remain unchanged. Table I presents the implicit values of : consistent with the "observable" parameters being used. They show the proportional increase in the probability of finding a protected job, through being unemployed and investing fully in search, that would be required to gene-ate a rate of voluntary unemployment equal to the observed rate.
The values of 1 are larger, the smaller the value of X. This is necessarily the case, since : has to induce a given rate of voluntary unemployment despite a lower rate of openings in the protected sector. Table II shows the estimates implied by this theory of the marginal contributions of both types of labor in terms of their respective free entry sector wages, as well as the relative marginal contribution of educated to noneducated labor in terms of their observed relative wages in the free entry sector.
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Conclusions
The followving conclusions can be derived from Table II : First, the ratio between the true marginal product of labor and the free entry sector wage is highly sensitive to the demand elasticity for labor and rather insensitive to the value of the other parameters, g and X. 2 2 Hence, having selected a value for this elasticity, we note that the corrective factor applied to the free entry sector wage in order to derive the corresponding marginal contribution of labor is relatively independent of the other parameters. Second, this corrective factor is less than unity for demand elasticities smaller than five for educated labor and smaller than four for uneducated labor. Within these ranges, the free entry sector wage will overestimate the true marginal product of labor, particularly for educated labor. The correction factor ranges from one-half to one and from two-thirds to one for educated and uneducated labor, respectively.
The relative marginal contribution of educated and noneducated labor determines the profitability of investment in schooling. Table  II presents these relative marginal contributions in terms of the relative wages of both types of labor in the free entry sector. The correction factors are again less than one for demand elasticities for labor between one and five. This means that, within that elasticity range, relative wages in the free entry sector overestimate the true benefits of investment in schooling.
From the above, we conclude that, for a wide range of demand elasticity values, the wage in the free entry sector overestimates the true marginal contribution of labor. Furthermore, relative wages by schooling in that sector also overestimate the true contribution of investments in education. The more inelastic the demand for labor, the larger the discrepancies involved. In this model the measure for the total contribution of labor to output (dX/dL) also represents the social price of labor, i.e., the welfare cost of removing one worker from the labor force. 2 3 The social price of labor is positive only to the extent that removal induces-via the employment effect (dL/dL)-a decline in the unprotected sector employment and output. Declines in unemployment (dU/dL) induced by the removal of that worker do not generate a welfare loss and therefore have no bearing on the social price of labor. If the own employment effect is 0.73 (value for uneducated workers in the first row of Table II) , it means that the removal of 10 workers from the labor force will come at the expense of 2.7 unemployed workers and 7.3 workers previously employed in the unprotected sector. 2 4 The social price of those 10 workers is 7.3 times the unprotected sector wages, since the unemployed workers do not have any bearing on the social cost.
This result is different from the one derived by Harberger (1971) where unemployment is a result of labor-leisure choices and where unemployed workers have a supply price above the unprotected sector wage. In Harberger's framework the cost of labor is equal to the unprotected sector wage if the worker is removed from that sector and is equal to the supply price or value of leisure if it comes from the pool of unemployed. The unprotected sector wage becomes therefore the lower bound for the social price of labor, the discrepancy becoming smaller, the smaller the rate of unemployment.
The basic difference in the two approaches are the factors explaining the preferences for being unemployed. In Harberger's approach leisure is the alternative to an unprotected sector job, i.e., the choice of unemployment is Pareto optimal. In the approach outlined here, unemployment is a result not of labor-leisure choices but of search activities perceived as affecting the individual probability of obtaining a protected sector job. Given that the number of vacancies in the protected sector are given, unemployment is simply a mechanisin for redistributing a constant aggregate probability across workers; unemployment therefore represents a dead weight or a non-Pareto-optimal situation.
A second differenice is that the nmacroeconomic nature of the model presented here captures, through the employment effect, the effect of removing one worker from the labor forces on the employment of other workers. Other workers' choices are affected to the extent that removal affects the previous equilibrium between the employment-unemployment plans. If the removal of the worker diminishes unemployment in the rest of the labor forces, the worker has induced a positive externality; other workers increase output without a social cost given the absence of leisure beniefits. If the effect is to induce additional unemployment in the rest of the labor force, the worker has generated a negative externality; the decline in that employment generates a loss in output without gains in leisure.
From that above, it is clear that the factors explaining a worker's refusal to accept an unprotected sector job-either leisure or search for a protected sector job-are crucial in deriving the social price of labor. If these factors are search activities, the model presented here will be an appropriate framework to derive these types of estimates. 
